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The paper examines the empirical relationship between remittances and economic growth for a sample of 62
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depends on domestic institutions and macroeconomic environment in the receiving country. Unlike the ‘less
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1 Introduction
Workers’ remittances are transfers of income from international migrants to family members in the workers’
country of origin. According to estimates by World Bank (2015), remittances received by developing countries
have grown by around 29 % between 2010 and 2014 from $291.9 billion to $377.8 billion. Remittances represent
a substantial ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources from developed to developing countries, second only to foreign direct
investment (Figure 1). Relatively speaking, the volume of foreign aid (Oﬀicial Development Assistance or ODA)
was a meager $237.6 million in 2014 (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Remittances and FDI received by developing countries, 1996–2014.
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Figure 2: Foreign aid received by developing countries, 2005–2014.
Moreover, remittances seem to be less volatile than other sources of external ﬁnance such as FDI and ODA
because of the former’s countercyclical nature. As can be seen in the Figure 2, the growth in the volume of aid
seems to have stagnated in 2009 and has stayed approximately at the same level over the last ﬁve years. Even
FDI inﬂows experienced a sharper decline after the 2008 crisis and showed greater volatility in the post-crisis
period. Contrary to that, remittances experienced a much smaller decline after 2008. For instance, during the
time period 2010–2014, the annual average growth rate in remittances received by developing countries was
6.72 % whereas that of FDI and ODA were 6.36 % and −0.4 % respectively. Many studies have found evidence
in support of the countercyclical nature of remittances (Chami et al. 2008; Frankel 2011). Such countercyclical
behavior of remittances can probably be attributed to the fact that a large proportion of these transfers are
intended for altruistic purposes (Agarwal and Horowitz 2002). Workers may try to remit more money back
home during the times of economic distress to help their families ﬁnancially (Ratha 2013). This, in turn, may
act as a counterbalance against the negative eﬀects of a recession, ensure stability in consumption level and
thus aid in economic growth.
Hypothetically speaking, there are multiple channels through which remittances exert a positive impact at
the household as well as country level. It acts as a major vehicle for reducing the scale of poverty in developing
countries. Besides monetary gains, remittances enable families in poorer countries to invest in health and edu-
cation. There are positive spill-over eﬀects associated with remittances. For instance, the increased expenditure
on consumption and investment by remittance-receiving households beneﬁts others in the community. Finally,
remittances add to the foreign reserves of the receiver countries and increase their creditworthiness.
Quite a few studies have examined the remittances-growth relationship (see Section 3) however the empiri-
cal literature on the eﬀects of remittances on growth still appears to be inconclusive (Barajas et al. 2009; Nwaogu
and Ryan 2015). It is true that use of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, estimation techniques and mix of countries
in the sample by diﬀerent studies drives this inconsistency in ﬁndings to a large extent. However, this is not the
sole reason behind the discrepancy in the empirical literature and ‘openness’ seems to play a signiﬁcant role
in this context. The econometric ﬁndings obtained in this study show that the level of openness, which varies
from country to country, is a deciding factor behind the eﬀectiveness of the remittances in promoting growth
(see Section 4.2 also). To the best of my knowledge, there exists virtually no study which tries to assess whether
openness inﬂuences the growth eﬀects of the remittance ﬂows. This paper attempts to extend the literature
in this direction by assessing the relationship between remittances and economic growth for a sample of 62
developing countries during the time period 1990–2014.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the hypothetical channels through
which remittancesmay aﬀect growth. A reviewof the relevant literature has been presented in Section 3. Section
4 discusses the methodology and data used in this study. Section 5 presents and interprets the econometric
ﬁndings. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Remittances andEconomicGrowth: Theory
Within a “growth accounting framework”, there are three channels through which remittances can aﬀect
growth (Barajas et al. 2009).
i) Physical and human capital accumulation: Remittances can act as an alternative source of ﬁnance for
funding investment in capital goods, besides the domestic ﬁnancial sector. If there are signiﬁcant credit con-
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straints in the remitter’s home country which may not be too uncommon in many developing countries, then
remittances can signiﬁcantly increase the ability of the remittance-receiving households to ﬁnance investments
and thus aid in physical capital accumulation. Access to remittance inﬂows may also increase the creditwor-
thiness of the recipient households and make access to domestic credit easier for themwhich will also increase
the capital accumulation rate through increased investments. Another mechanism through which remittances
can increase capital accumulation is through their eﬀects on macroeconomic stability. If remittances make the
domestic economy less volatile against external shocks then that will improve the investment climate leading
to more domestic investments by ﬁrms. Using a sample of 70 remittance-receiving countries, Chami, Hakura,
and Montiel (2009)show that remittances do reduce output volatility.
As mentioned previously, remittances also enable recipient households to invest in education. This should
have positive spillover eﬀects. For instance, a rise in the education level of the population increases the human
capital stock of the countrywhich, in turn, inﬂuences innovation and technological advancement and positively
aﬀects growth.
ii) Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth: The eﬀect of remittances on TFP growth is slightly ambiguous.
Remittances may lead to an increase in the volume of funds ﬂowing through the domestic banking system. In
that case, the capability of the banking sector to allocate capital can go up resulting in more eﬀicient invest-
ments. However, inﬂow of remittances can also lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate which will
hurt exports. This implies a potential for Dutch disease eﬀects. Such eﬀects would materialise if exchange rate
appreciation results in the contraction of sectors of production that generate dynamic production externali-
ties (Barajas et al. 2009). Thus, the eﬀect of remittances on economic growth through this channel can be both
positive or negative.
iii)Labour force growth: Another channel throughwhich remittancesmay impact growth is through labour
force participation. Remittance receipts could be expected to have a negative impact on participation rates be-
cause it may induce household members to treat the remittance money as a substitute for labour income. There
is a signiﬁcant chance of moral hazard problem in this regard as the recipient may divert the remittance income
towards consumption of leisure without the knowledge of the remitter because of the distance between the
two. Sindhu (2007) and Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam (2015)talk about the problem of backward-
bending supply curve in the Indian state of Kerala where the tendency to substitute work for leisure is higher
in households receiving remittances than households without remittances. Kozel and Alderman (1990)studied
labour force participation and labour supply in Pakistan and found a signiﬁcant negative impact of remittances
on the labour force participation of males.
The discussion above gives a notion that the theoretical eﬀect of remittances on growth is ambiguous. It can
be either positive or negative, depending on which channel is dominant.
3 Reviewof the Literature
There exists a considerably large literature which tries to investigate the growth eﬀects of remittances. The
literature can be broadly classiﬁed into two groups: (a) time series studies exploring the aforementioned rela-
tionship for a speciﬁc country and (b) panel studies doing the same for a group of developing countries. Given
the scope of the paper, we only focus on studies belonging to the latter category.
Overall, the empirical evidence on the relationship between remittances and economic growth is mixed.
Using a panel dataset on 114 countries for the time period 1991–2003, Catrinescu et al. (2006)ﬁnd a posi-
tive remittance-growth nexus. However, they report that the relationship is not very robust. Pradhan, Upad-
hyay, and Upadhyaya (2008)examine the same in a sample of 39 developing countries using panel data from
1980–2004. The study estimates a standard growth model and ﬁnds that remittances aﬀect growth positively.
Using panel data from 1980 to 2005, Fayissa and Nsiah (2010)examine the aggregate impact of remittances
on the economic growth of 17 Latin American countries within the conventional neoclassical growth model.
They ﬁnd that remittances have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on both the current level of gross
domestic product and the economic growth rate of Latin American countries. Using panel data on 31 develop-
ing countries from Latin America, Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa from 1996–2006, Ahortor and Adenutsi
(2009)report that the overall eﬀect of remittances on economic growth is positive.
However, these ﬁndings have been challenged by another set of studies who report a negative or a non-
existent relationship between remittances and growth. For instance, Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003)es-
timate the growth eﬀects of workers’ remittances using panel data on 83 countries during the time period
1970–1998 and conclude that remittances have a negative eﬀect on economic growth. They cite the moral
hazard problem as a signiﬁcant factor behind this negative impact. Using a cross-country growth regression
framework, Spatafora (2005)shows that there is no statistically signiﬁcant relation between real per capita out-
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put growth and remittances. Barajas et al. (2009)examine the empirical relationship between remittances and
growth using panel growth regressions on a sample of 84 recipient countries for the 1970–2004 period. They
ﬁnd that remittances have contributed little to economic growth and may have even retarded growth in some.
Nwaogu and Ryan (2015)estimate how foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign aid and remittances impact
the economic growth of 53 African and 34 Latin American and Caribbean countries using a dynamic special
framework. They ﬁnd that remittances do not aﬀect growth in theAfrican countries and that, in case of the Latin
American and Caribbean countries, the relationship between remittances and growth is positive but fragile and
sensitive to model speciﬁcations.
4 Methodology andData
4.1 Estimation of the full sample
The remittances-economic growth relationship has been initially estimated by an augmented version of the
Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996)model. It is a conventional growth equation which, after the
inclusion of a remittance variable, looks as follows:
𝐺𝐷𝑃u�u� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒u�u� + 𝛽2𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃u�u� + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡u�u� + 𝛽4𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟u�u� + 𝑒u�u� (1)
where, in country ‘i’ and at time ‘t’, ‘GDP’ is growth rate of GDP (constant 2005 US$), ‘Remittance’ denotes
total remittances expressed as% ofGDP, ‘I/GDP’ is gross domestic investments expressed as% ofGDP, ‘Export’
is growth rate of exports (constant 2005 US$), ‘Labour’ represents growth rate of the labour force and ‘e’ is the
error term. A time trend has also been included in all the estimating regressions. All variables are expressed
in their natural logarithms. I take exports and labour in their ﬁrst diﬀerences (growth rate) and not in levels
to eliminate any potential bias emerging from non-stationarity. Remittances and investment has been taken in
levels because the value of these variables always lie between 0 and 1 as they are expressed as percentage of
GDP. Therefore, it can be argued that these variables are potentially I(0). Data on all the variables used in this
study have been obtained from the World Bank (2015) World Development Indicators database.
I initially estimate eq. 1for a panel consisting of all the 62 countries in the sample (see Table 10 for a full list
of the countries) and ﬁnd that remittances have no eﬀect on growth (results are presented in the succeeding
section). Next, the variable, ‘Remittances’ is dropped from themodel and an interaction term of the Remittances
and trade openness (Rtrade) has been introduced.
𝐺𝐷𝑃u�u� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒u�u� + 𝛽2𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃u�u� + 𝛽3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠u�u� + 𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟u�u� + 𝑒u�u� (2)
The hypothesis that I test here is that growth eﬀects of remittances increase in more open economies.
Remittances do not necessarily lead to long term business investments because remittance-receiving house-
holds generally spend the received money on consumption or ‘consumptive’ investments, such as, food and
health (Lubambu 2014). In other words, the households have two choices: either they spend on consumption
goods or on capital goods. Needless to say, the higher the percentage of remittances spent on the latter, themore
pronounced would be the growth-enhancing impact of the remittances. The factors which dictate the pattern
of allocation of the remittances income are the following:
i) Level of poverty: If the country has a high level of poverty, naturally the households who receive remit-
tances will end up using most of the received money on basic goods such as food, clothing and medicine and
will rarely allocate anything for investment purposes.
ii)Development of ﬁnancial markets: In those countries where access to industrial credit is limited because
the ﬁnancial market is underdeveloped, the growth-eﬀects of remittances will be much less pronounced. If the
ﬁnancial market is well-developed, then people tend to save more with ﬁnancial institutions which, in turn,
will transform these savings into proﬁtable investments. Eventually, this will boost the economic growth of the
country. If the remittances recipient is not willing to undertake any entrepreneurial activity, but rather save,
even then a well-functioning ﬁnancial market can mobilise those savings into investments. Thus, remittances
can be expected to increase investments in a country with eﬀicient ﬁnancial markets (Fajnzylber and Lopez
2008)
iii) Quality of institutions: Ineﬀicient domestic institutions may lead to a variety of problems like
widespread corruption, “red-tape” and lack of transparency of rule of law. All these factors adversely aﬀect the
business climate in the economy and therefore discourage investments. For instance, if institutions are weak,
government oﬀicials might engage in rent-seeking activities which can prove to be damaging for economic de-
velopment (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Tanzi 1998). In such cases, even if remittances receivers have the will and
the resources to invest they will not do so because of the aforementioned factors.
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There is a large literature which says that openness plays a signiﬁcant role in mitigating the problems of
ineﬀicient ﬁnancial and political institutions. In other words, the more open the economies, the more devel-
oped the ﬁnancial markets and domestic institutions are (see, for instance, Demetriades and Law 2006; Baltagi,
Demetriades, and Law 2007; David, Mlachila, and Moheeput 2014, among others). If that is the case, then the
coeﬀicient on ‘Rtrade’ in eq. 2can be expected to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
4.2 Classiﬁcation of Countries on theBasis of ‘Openness’
Next, I classify the countries in my sample into ‘more open’ and ‘less open’ economies and estimate eq. 1for
each of the groups. If openness does lead to the development of eﬀicient institutions and ﬁnancial markets,
then the growth-enhancing eﬀects of remittances should be larger in the sample of ‘more open’ countries.
However, prior to this exercise, we need to deﬁne ‘openness’. There is no clear consensus on how to deﬁne
openness because of its multi-dimensional nature. Consequently, to capture diﬀerent aspects of ‘openness’,
multiple proxies for the same have been used so that it can be ensured that the ﬁndings of this paper are robust
and not sensitive to how we deﬁne ‘openness’.
Countries have been assigned to ‘less open’ or ‘more open’ group using the following 4 criteria:
1) Trade volume: One of the most common measures of openness of a country is the volume of trade that
the country does with the rest of the world. Therefore, I use export openness (Export/GDP, where exports as
percentage of GDP), import penetration ratio (Import/GDP, imports as percentage of GDP) and total trade as
percentage of GDP (Trade/GDP) as the three criteria under ‘trade volume’. The higher the value of any of these
measures, the more open the country is.
There is a no clearly deﬁned threshold of trade openness which helps in identifying open or closed
economies. Hence, I work here with the concept of relative openness. For each measure, those countries which
are above the mean openness of all the countries in my sample in 2014 have been classiﬁed as ‘more open’ and
those below the mean are deﬁned as ‘less-open’.1 Out of the 62 countries in my sample, number of ‘more open’
countries are 25, 27 and 26 as per the export, import and trade criteria respectively. Overall, the three lists are
almost identical with only 4 countries switching groups when we move from the trade/GDP to export/GDP
criteria (Azerbaijan, Costa Rica, Ghana and Tajikistan) and only 3 countries when we do the same from total
trade to import penetration ratio (Bolivia, Haiti and Senegal).
2)Trade barrier: An open country should encouragemore trade and, subsequently, should have lower tariﬀs
on its imports compared to comparatively less open or more protected economies. Hence, if the tariﬀ rate
(applied, weighted mean, all products, %) in a particular country is less than the mean tariﬀ rate of the sample
then it has been classiﬁed as an open country and vice versa. According to this criterion, 34 countries have been
categorised as ‘more open’.
3) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Next, I use the volume of FDI (as percentage of GDP) as a condition for
openness. The reason being more open countries are less protective of their domestic industries and encourage
foreign investors and multinational corporations to come into the domestic economy and invest. Like in the
case of trade volume, a country with FDI/GDP ratio higher than the mean FDI/GDP ratio of the sample has
been classiﬁed as ‘more open’. According to FDI/GDP, only 23 countries come out to be ‘open’.
4) Exchange rate distortions: The ﬁnal criteria used to deﬁne ‘openness’ is exchange rate distortion, deﬁned
as, price level ratio of purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor (GDP) to market exchange rate. In
absence of any distortion the ratio will be 1. The closer the value of this ratio to 1, the less the distortion is. For
none of the developing countries in the sample, the ratio is 1 or even close to 1 suggesting that there are some
exchange rate distortions in all those economies resulting from government intervention. As per this criterion
(mean ratio was 0.45 in 2014), it is found that 38 countries can be classiﬁed to be as ‘more open’ economies.
Not surprisingly, the number of countries, classiﬁed as ‘more open’ or ‘less open’, varies signiﬁcantly across
diﬀerent indicators of openness. Table 1presents the top receivers of remittances among developing countries
in 2014. India tops the chart with an annual receipt of 70.4 billion current US dollars in 2014 followed by China
and Philippines.Most of the SouthAsian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) feature amongst
the top receivers.
Table 1: Top remittance receiving developing countries, 2014.
Country Personal remittances, received (current US$)
India 70.4
China 29.9
Philippines 28.4
Mexico 24.5
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Nigeria 20.8
Egypt 19.6
Pakistan 17.1
Bangladesh 15.0
Indonesia 8.6
Lebanon 7.4
Sri Lanka 7.0
∗ Source:World Bank (2015).
Out of the top 11 receivers, 6 countries namely India, Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
fall into the category of ‘less open’ regardless of which criterion we select. China, Mexico, Philippines and
Indonesia fall in, what I call, the ‘grey’ area. In other words, these four countries can be classiﬁed as both ‘more
open’ or ‘less open’ depending on which criterion we choose to consider. For instance, China falls in the group
of ‘more open’ if we deﬁne ‘openness’ by tariﬀ barrier or exchange rate distortions but gets classiﬁed as ‘less
open’ if we look at FDI or trade volume. Among the rest of the countries in the sample, some of the African
countries such as Rwanda, Madagascar, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mali, Kenya, Guinea-Bissau almost always came
out to be ‘less open’. On the other hand, countries such as Albania, Georgia, Jordan, Macedonia, Malaysia and
Moldova always came out to be ‘more open’.
In the next section, the econometric ﬁndings are presented. The model has been initially estimated by em-
ploying Pooled OLS and Fixed eﬀects model techniques (Hausman test ruled in favour of Fixed eﬀects estima-
tion). In case there is the problem of autocorrelation, Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method has
been applied. Furthermore, endogeneity can potentially be a serious issue in the estimation of such growth
models. There is ample empirical evidence of reverse causality from GDP towards trade and investment (see,
for example, Anwer and Sampath 1999; Tsen 2006; Chatterji, Mohan, and Ghosh Dastidar 2014). Hypothetically
speaking, there can be reverse causality fromGDP towards remittances too. For instance, as the economy of the
home country grows, its ﬁnancial sector develops and thus it becomes easier to remit money back home. On
the other hand, slower economic growth can lead to higher outward migration and higher remittances conse-
quently. Slower growth can alsomake altruistic migrants remitmoremoney back home to help familymembers
cope with economic hardship. (Barajas et al. 2009). If endogeneity is detected, Instrumental Variable (IV) GMM
approach has been applied to rectify the problem.
5 Results
Table 2presents the estimation results of eqs 1and 2for all the countries in the sample for the time period
1990–2014.
Table 2: Regression results, 1990–2014.
Independ 1) Equation (1) Equation (1) 2)
ent variable Pooled OLS FEM GMM GMM
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Remittance 0.001 0.005 0.000
Rtrade 0.002*
I/GDP 0.023* 0.025* 0.019* 0.011*
Export 0.164* 0.153* 0.240* 0.171*
Labour 0.203* 0.157 0.290* 0.181*
Constant −0.051* −0.055* −0.017 −0.015
R2 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.24
No. of countries 62 62 62 62
Hausman Test P-value = 0.00 P-value = 0.34 P-value = 0.36
Wooldridge Test P-value = 0.25
Hansen J statistic
∗ Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth (GDPit). *,** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 %,5 %and 1 %respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors have been used. All regressions include a time trend. Themean variance infllation factor (vif) value is considerably lower than 10 (1.05) in each
of the regressions which conﬁrms absence of any seriousmulticollinearity.
When estimated for the full sample, remittances (expressed as percentage of GDP) have no impact on GDP
growth. This ﬁnding is robust across all the estimation methods- Pooled OLS, FEM and IV GMM. However,
the interaction term of remittances and trade in eq. 2(Column IV) comes out to be positive and statistically
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signiﬁcant which implies that as the openness of the countries go up the growth eﬀects of remittances start to
increase. As discussed in Section 4.1, this ﬁnding is expected since as a country becomes more open, the do-
mestic institutions and ﬁnancial markets start to develop and this, in turn, will enhance the growth-enhancing
impact of remittances in twoways: ﬁrstly, as domestic institutions improvewith increasing openness, incidence
of rent seeking activities and corruption starts to decline which creates a business-friendly environment and
boosts investor conﬁdence in the local economy. As a result, higher proportion of remittances are invested in
capital goods and consequently economic growth rate rises. Secondly, as ﬁnancial market develops, access to
banks go up and, as a result, remitters’ family can deposit the remittances money as savings which then gets
channelised into proﬁtable investments.
Other variables such as exports growth and investments (I/GDP) come out to be signiﬁcant determinants
of growth and these ﬁndings are robust across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. In fact, the magnitude of the
eﬀect of these conventional sources of growth outweighs that of remittances considerably. The Wooldridge
test for autocorrelation conﬁrms that our FEM estimates do not suﬀer from any autocorrelation bias. However,
both Wu-Hausman F test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test reject the null of exogeneity (p-value =
0.00, where the null hypothesis is that the concerned regressor is exogenous) for investments. Therefore, I use
ﬁrst and second year lagged values of I/GDP as instruments and re-estimate eq. 1using IV GMM approach.
The new ﬁndings (presented in Columns III) are largely unchanged except the coeﬀicient on the labour force
growth becomes signiﬁcant.
Next, I categorise the countries into ‘more open’ and ‘less open’ groups based on the level of openness and
re-estimate eq. (1).2 Table 3–Table 5below present the regression results for the 3 trade volume measures.
Table 3: Regression results based on Export/GDP criterion, 1990–2014.
Independent
variable
LO_FEM LO_GMM MO_FEM MO_GMM
Remittance −0.009* −0.001 0.011* 0.003*
I/GDP 0.019* 0.004 0.027* 0.024*
Export 0.137* 0.163* 0.175* 0.197*
Labour 0.199 −0.021 0.085 0.274*
Constant −0.039 0.011 −0.059* −0.060*
R2 0.15 0.20 0.28 0.34
No. of countries 37 37 25 25
Hansen J Test P-value = 0.22 P-value = 0.38 P-value = 0.79 P-value = 0.33
Wooldridge Test
∗ Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth (GDPit).*,** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 %, 5 %and 1 %respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors have been used. All regressions include a time trend. ‘LO’ and ‘MO’ stand for less open andmore open country groups respectively. Themean
variance infllation factor (vif) value is considerably lower than 10 (1.07 and 1.11 for the LO andMO regressions respectively). First and second year lagged values
of I/GDP have been used to instrument I/GDP in the GMMestimation.
Table 4: Regression results based on Import/GDP criterion, 1990–2014.
Independent
variable
LO_FEM LO_GMM MO_FEM MO_GMM
Remittance −0.003 −0.000 0.011* 0.004*
I/GDP 0.023* 0.012* 0.025* 0.017*
Export 0.162* 0.170* 0.160* 0.154*
Labour 0.309 0.117 −0.054 0.112
Constant −0.058 −0.021 −0.051* −0.030
R2 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.24
No. of countries 35 35 27 27
Hansen J Test P-value = 0.22 P-value = 0.81 P-value = 0.76 P-value = 0.13
Wooldridge Test
∗ Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth (GDPit).*,** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 %,5 %and 1 %respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors have been used. All regressions include a time trend. First and second year lagged values of I/GDP of remittances have been used to instrument
I/GDP and remittances respectively in the GMMestimation.
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Table 5: Regression results based on Trade/GDP criterion, 1990–2014.
Independent
variable
LO_FEM LO_GMM MO_FEM MO_GMM
Remittance −0.004 −0.001 0.010* 0.004*
I/GDP 0.022* 0.011 0.026* 0.017*
Export 0.151* 0.170* 0.158* 0.169*
Labour 0.203 0.038 0.074 0.243*
Constant −0.049 −0.010 −0.056* −0.039
R2 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.30
No. of countries 36 36 26 26
Hansen J Test P-value = 0.19 P-value = 0.81 P-value = 0.87 P-value = 0.17
Wooldridge Test
∗ Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth (GDPit). *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 %, 5 %and 1 %respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors have been used. All regressions include a time trend. First and second year lagged values of I/GDP have been used to instrument I/GDP in the
GMMestimation.
In each case, investment came out to be endogenous whereas remittances came out to be endogenous for
the ‘less open’ country group in the case of Import/GDP (P-value = 0.00, Wu-Hausman F test and Durbin-Wu-
Hausman chi-square test). Hansen J test signiﬁes that the instruments used in theGMMestimation are valid and
none of the models seem to suﬀer from autocorrelation bias. As far as the impact of remittances is concerned,
results are pretty similar across the three estimations. Remittances seem to aﬀect growth positively in the ‘more
open’ countries and this result is robust across diﬀerent estimation methods and diﬀerent trade volume indi-
cators. Conversely, the eﬀect of remittances is statistically insigniﬁcant and fragile for the ‘less open’ groups;
sometimes the coeﬀicient on this variable even takes a negative value. Table 6–Table 8present the econometric
ﬁndings when we use FDI, trade barrier and exchange rate distortions as the openness indicator respectively.
Table 6: Regression results based on FDI/GDP criterion, 1990–2014.
Independent variable LO_FEM LO_GMM MO_FEM
Remittance 0.000 0.003* 0.010*
I/GDP 0.021* 0.009 0.016
Export 0.154* 0.171 0.144*
Labour 0.162 0.408 0.150
Constant −0.049 0.002 −0.029
R2 0.20 0.14 0.34
No. of countries 39 39 23
Hansen J Test P-value = 0.22 P-value = 0.25 P-value = 0.79
Wooldridge Test
∗ Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth (GDPit). *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 %, 5 %and 1 %respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors have been used. All regressions include a time trend. First and second year lagged values of I/GDP have been used to instrument I/GDP in the
GMMestimation.
Table 7: Regression results based on trade barrier criterion, 1990–2014.
Independent variable LO_FEM MO_FEM MO_FGLS
Remittance 0.001 0.007* 0.002*
I/GDP 0.017* 0.034* 0.036*
Export 0.135* 0.174* 0.189*
Labour 0.493 −0.029 0.154*
Constant −0.043* 0.076* −0.09*
R2 0.23 0.29
No. of countries 28 34 34
Wooldridge Test P-value = 0.64 P-value = 0.15
∗ Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth (GDPit). *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 %, 5 %and 1 %respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors have been used. All regressions include a time trend.
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Table 8: Regression results based on exchange rate distortions criterion, 1990–2014.
Independent variable LO_FEM MO_FEM
Remittance 0.003 0.005*
I/GDP 0.020* 0.028*
Export 0.165* 0.134*
Labour 0.645* −0.235*
Constant −0.06* −0.056
R2 0.32 0.15
No. of countries 24 38
Wooldridge Test P-value = 0.82 P-value = 0.62
∗ Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth (GDPit). *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 %, 5 %and 1 %respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors have been used. All regressions include a time trend.
In the regression results based on FDI criterion, a joint endogeneity test for export, remittances and in-
vestment denotes that the model with ‘more open’ countries do not suﬀer from any endogeneity (P-value =
0.38). However, investment is endogenous in the equation with the ‘less open’ countries. The ﬁnal two models
(see Table 7and Table 8) do not suﬀer from any endogeneity bias.2 When we take FDI/GDP as the openness
proxy, remittances received by the ‘less-open’ countries display some statistically signiﬁcant growth eﬀects but
it should be noted that the magnitude of the eﬀect (0.003) is still smaller compared to that in the case of the
‘more open’ countries (0.010). The eﬀect, however, disappears again when we switch to other openness indica-
tors such as trade barrier and exchange rate distortions. The results again strongly support the hypothesis that
growth eﬀects of remittances are more pronounced in the case of ‘more open’ countries.
It can also probably be asserted that quantity or amount of remittances does not matter-as far as economic
growth is concerned. The results indicate that the growth eﬀects of remittances are likely to bemost pronounced
in the small open economies. Most of the highest remittance receivers, such as India, Egypt, Pakistan, Nigeria,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, predominantly feature in the ‘less open’ groups. Philippines and Indonesia, also
amongst the top 10 remittance receivers, also came out to be ‘less open’, apart from when we use trade barrier
as the criterion for openness. Even, China appears in the ’less open’ group when we consider trade volumes as
an indicator of openness. Lebanon is the only country (among the top 10 receivers) to be always classiﬁed as
‘more open’.
As discussed earlier, for remittances to lead to economic growth, the following channels are necessary:
developed ﬁnancial markets, eﬀicient domestic institutions, low poverty level and high Human Development
Index (HDI). Table 9below compares a variety of ﬁnancial, institutional and poverty/HDI indicators across
3 groups of countries. The ﬁrst group of countries (more open) are those countries in my sample which have
always come out to be ‘more open’ regardless of thewaywe deﬁne ‘openness’. The second category of countries
(those in the ‘grey’ area) are those which came out to be both ‘more open’ and ‘less open’ depending on the way
we deﬁne ‘openness’. Finally, the third category includes those countries who are some of the highest recipients
of remittances in the developing world and have always featured in the ‘less open’ list.
Table 9: Financial, Institutional and Poverty/HDI: ‘More open’ vs ‘Less open’ countries.
Coun-
try
Financial indicators Institutional quality Poverty/HDI
CII* Do-
mes-
tic
credit
by
ﬁnan-
cial
sector
(% of
GDP)
Do-
mes-
tic
credit
to pri-
vate
sector
(% of
GDP)
Bor-
row-
ers
from
com-
mer-
cial
banks
(per
1,000
adults)
Corruption
Perception
Index*
Gov-
ern-
ment
Eﬀec-
tive-
ness
Regu-
latory
Qual-
ity
Rule
of
law
Poverty gap at
$1.90 a day
(2011 PPP) (%)
Hu-
man
de-
vel-
op-
ment
Index
More open countries
Alba-
nia
6 68.1 37.6 155.4 33 −0.7 0.23 −0.37 0.22 0.73
Geor-
gia
8 48.5 45.2 590.3 52 0.48 0.93 0.2 3.36 0.75
Jor-
dan
0 – 70.2 – 49 0.13 0.08 0.48 0.03 0.75
Lebanon 6 – 103.3 294.3 27 −0.38 −0.22 −0.76 – 0.77
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Mace-
donia,
FYR
7 49.9 49.6 319.4 45 0.15 0.47 −0.03 0.3 0.75
Malaysia 7 140.5 120.6 392 52 1.14 0.84 0.64 0.04 0.78
Moldova 6 38.9 37.1 52.1 35 −0.38 0.02 −0.27 0.01 0.69
Nicaragua8 47.2 34.1 – 28 −0.83 −0.38 −0.67 3.62 0.63
Aver-
age
6 65.5 62.2 300.6 40.1 −0.05 0.25 −0.1 1.1 0.73
Countries in the “grey” area
China 6 169.2 141.8 317.9 36 0.34 −0.27 −0.33 2.66 0.73
Mex-
ico
8 50.3 31.1 228.6 35 0.19 0.43 −0.45 0.67 0.76
In-
done-
sia
6 43.5 36.5 397.3 34 −0.01 −0.1 −0.35 2.89 0.68
Philip-
pines
5 55.8 39.2 – 38 0.19 −0.01 −0.33 2.74 0.67
Aver-
age
6.25 79.7 62.1 314.6 35.8 0.1 0.01 −0.37 2.24 0.71
Less open countries
India 7 74.7 51.1 200 38 −0.2 −0.45 −0.09 4.2 0.61
Pak-
istan
3 47.5 15.6 23.3 29 −0.75 −0.69 −0.78 1.1 0.54
Bangladesh0 58.6 42.4 81.3 25 −0.77 −0.94 −0.72 11 0.57
Egypt,
Arab
Rep.
8 92.8 27.3 105.1 37 −0.82 −0.75 −0.6 – 0.69
Nige-
ria
6 21.6 14.6 30.8 27 −1.19 −0.82 −1.08 21 0.51
Sri
Lanka
6 45.3 28.2 – 38 0.09 −0.08 −0.15 0.26 0.76
Aver-
age
5 56.75 29.9 88.1 32.3 −0.61 −0.66 −0.57 7.5 0.61
∗ Source: Data on corruption has been obtained from Transparency International. Data on the rest of the variables are fromWDI, 2015. ‘–’ denotesmissing
data.
Note: CII=credit information indexmeasures rules a昀�fecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available through public or private credit
registries. The index ranges from0 to 8, with higher values indicating the availability ofmore credit information, from either a public registry or a private
bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. **Corruption Perception index by Transparency International-100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
Table 10: Countries in the sample.
Less open More open
Argentina Albania
Armenia Azerbaijan
Bangladesh Belarus
Benin Belize
Brazil Bolivia
Cameroon Botswana
China Bulgaria
Colombia Cambodia
Dominican Republic Costa Rica
Ecuador Georgia
Egypt, Arab Rep. Honduras
El Salvador Jordan
Ethiopia Kyrgyz Republic
Ghana Lebanon
Guatemala Macedonia, FYR
Guinea-Bissau Malaysia
Haiti Moldova
India Nicaragua
Indonesia Paraguay
Kenya Romania
Madagascar Sierra Leone
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Mali Thailand
Mexico Togo
Morocco Tunisia
Mozambique Ukraine
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Uganda
1 Note: Classiﬁcation of the countries in the sample into "more-open" and "less-open" categories according to the export openness criterion.
‘More open’ countries score better in each and every indicator than the ‘less-open’ economies. The former
has much more developed ﬁnancial markets, more eﬀicient institutions, lower incidence of corruption and
better legal systems. For instance, domestic credit given to the private sector and borrowers from commercial
banks per 1000 adults in the ‘more open’ economies are 62.2 %ofGDP and 300.6 compared to an abysmal 29.9 %
of GDP and 88.1 in less open economies hinting towards the presence of a larger ﬁnancial sector in the former
countries. Similarly, ‘more open’ economies score higher in government eﬀectiveness (−0.5 vs −0.61), have
better regulatory qualities (0.25 vs −0.66) and subsequently experience less corruption (40.1 vs 32.3). Even, the
countries in the middle or ‘grey’ area perform better in all aspects as compared to the ‘less open’ countries. The
picture is slightlymixedwhenwe compare the ‘more open’ countries with those in themiddle. For instance, the
latter group (China, Mexico, Indonesia and Philippines) probably have more developed ﬁnancial markets than
the ‘more open’ developing countries. But the more open economies have better institutions, lower poverty
level and better human development.
Finally, countries such as China and India, the largest remittance receivers in the world, started adopting
liberalisation measures since the 1980s and 1990s respectively but probably they are still relatively less open
than the small open economies. Same argument can be applied for the other big remittance receiving countries
such as Philippines. One future area of investigation could be to check whether the growth eﬀects of remit-
tances diﬀer in these large remittance receiving countries across the pre and post liberalisation periods. There
is another possibility that remittances lead to economic development (such as, improvement in education and
health indicators) in the short run and the eﬀect on economic growth is only felt in the long run in these large
economies. This can be another topic for future research.
6 Conclusion
The paper examines the empirical relationship between remittances and economic growth for a sample of 62
countries over the time period 1990–2014. The econometric ﬁndings indicate that, when estimated for all the
countries in the sample, there is no evidence of a signiﬁcant relationship between remittances and growth.
Remittances only seem to promote growth in the ‘more open’ economies. The study uses a variety of indicators
of ‘openness’ and tests the proposition that openness of a country increases the growth eﬀects of remittances.
The ﬁnding, that remittances lead to higher growth in open economies, is robust regardless of how ‘openness’
is deﬁned. Conversely, no signiﬁcant eﬀect of remittances on growth could be detected in the case of ‘less open’
countries. That is because remittances are in themselves not suﬀicient for growth. The extent of the beneﬁt
depends on domestic institutions and macroeconomic environment. Unlike the ‘less open’ countries, ‘more
open’ countries have better institutions and better ﬁnancialmarkets to take advantage of the remittances income
and channelise them into proﬁtable investmentswhich, in turn, accelerates the rate of economic growth in these
countries.
However, the results obtained in this study also indicate that conventional sources of growth, like invest-
ments and international trade, have much larger growth eﬀects as compared to the remittances. So, the policy-
makers in the developing countries should not treat remittances as an alternative to these factors and pursue
appropriate policies to increase investments and trade in their countries to promote faster growth.
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Notes
1The lists of ‘more open’ and ‘less open’ countries according to each openness criterion have not been included in the paper. They will
be available upon request.
2I re-estimate the model for ‘more open’ countries with FGLS method in case of trade barrier criterion because I fail to reject the null of
‘no autocorrelation’ marginally. Overall the results do not change much; only the magnitude of the coeﬀicient on remittances goes down.
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